Scalable methods of discrete plant model generation for closed-loop model checking by Buzhinsky, Igor et al.
This document is downloaded from the




P.O. box 1000FI-02044 VTT
Finland
By using VTT’s Research Information Portal you are bound by the
following Terms & Conditions.
I have read and I understand the following statement:
This document is protected by copyright and other intellectual
property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of this
document is not permitted, except duplication for research use or
educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain
permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be
offered for sale.
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
Scalable methods of discrete plant model generation for closed-loop
model checking
Buzhinsky, Igor; Pakonen, Antti; Vyatkin, Valeriy
Published in:







Please cite the original version:
Buzhinsky, I., Pakonen, A., & Vyatkin, V. (2017). Scalable methods of discrete plant model generation for
closed-loop model checking. In Proceedings IECON 2017 - 43rd Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial
Electronics Society (pp. 5483-5488). IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
https://doi.org/10.1109/IECON.2017.8216949
Download date: 19. Dec. 2021
Scalable Methods of Discrete Plant Model
Generation for Closed-Loop Model Checking
Igor Buzhinsky1, 2, Antti Pakonen3, Valeriy Vyatkin1, 4
1 Department of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Aalto University, Finland
2 Computer Technology Department, ITMO University, St. Petersburg, Russia
3 VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd, Finland
4 Department of Computer Science, Electrical and Space Engineering, Luleå University of Technology, Sweden
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Abstract—To facilitate correctness and safety of mission-
critical automation systems, formal methods should be applied
in addition to simulation and testing. One of such formal
methods is model checking, which is capable of verifying complex
requirements for the system’s model. If both the controller and
the controlled plant are formally modeled, then the variant of
this technique called closed-loop model checking can be applied.
Recently, a technique of automatic plant model generation has
been proposed which is applicable in this scenario. This paper
continues the work in this direction by presenting two plant
model construction approaches which are much more scalable
with respect to the previous one, and puts this work into a more
practical context. The approaches are evaluated on a case study
from the nuclear automation domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliability is a crucial requirement for industrial automa-
tion systems. As a traditional approach of verification and
validation (V&V), testing is widely applied. However, certain
mission-critical systems such as aerospace and nuclear instru-
mentation and control (I&C) ones require stronger guarantees
of correctness and safety. Among well-known techniques
offering deeper analysis is model checking [1], a formal
verification technique which can prove system correctness (or,
more precisely, the correctness of the system’s formal model)
for the entire range of its possible behaviors.
In the industrial automation context, at least two separate
formal models are often considered: plant process model (later
referred to as the plant model) and the automation system
model (from now on, the controller model). Having only the
controller model, one can verify systems in open loop [2]:
the controller’s correctness is checked without considering
the environment where it is operating. If the plant model
is also available, the more natural closed-loop modeling and
verification [3]–[6] become possible.
Apart from the actual formal verification, the challenge of
formal model construction is crucial: it often requires manual
effort, making the prerequisites of model checking harder to
achieve and introducing the so-called human factor, a major
source of errors. For plant models in particular, a model
constructed manually might be too detailed and thus difficult
to verify, and adjusting it to make verification feasible would
require even more effort. Thus, approaches have been proposed
to construct plant models automatically [6], [7].
This paper builds on top of the work [6] and presents
two plant model construction methods whose main advantage
over [6] is the degree of scalability, which was limited in [6]
due to the use of SAT solvers. As input data, we use system
behavior traces collected with the help of a simulation model
of the system. This choice puts plant model construction in a
more practical context, which is demonstrated by evaluating
the proposed methods on a case study based on a nuclear
power plant (NPP) simulation model. Then, tuning model
generation parameters such as the size of the trace set and
the strength of discretization enables finding the right trade-
off between the precision of the model and the computational
complexity of its verification.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces con-
cepts used throughout the paper. Then, Section III describes
the proposed plant model generation techniques. In Section IV,
the techniques are evaluated on a case study. The results are
discussed in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Simulation environments
Specialized simulation environments aid the construction
of automation systems and allow simulating them. Typically,
these environments present means of constructing both the
controller model (that is, the entity whose correctness must be
ensured), and the plant model, with which the controller oper-
ates. In this paper, the Apros1 continuous process simulator is
used. In Apros, the automation system can be represented as a
number of function block diagrams, either expressing control
logic or the plant’s mechatronic aspects.
B. Discrete formal models
While simulation models are created for simulation and
testing, formal models are intended to be applicable for formal
verification. They are often represented in finite-state for-
malisms, such as finite-state machines [8], timed automata [9]
and Petri nets [10]. These kinds of formal models are applica-
ble for verification by means of model checking, which is de-
scribed in Section II-C. Simulation models, in contrast, cannot
be directly applied in model checking: they typically contain
1http://www.apros.fi/en/
continuous parameters which are not adequately supported by
modern model checkers.
Both the controller and the plant can be represented not only
by simulation models, but also by formal models. According
to [11], formal plant models are subdivided into detailed and
abstract ones: while detailed models preserve the internal
structure and parameters of the plant, abstract models are more
simple and only convey its external behavior. Plant model
construction in the present paper is based on traces showing
external behavior, so the inferred models are abstract.
C. Model checking
Model checking [1] is a formal verification technique which
exhaustively explores the state space of the system’s formal
model to check certain requirements, which may involve
statements over the model’s state at different moments of time.
The most common formal languages used to formulate such
temporal properties are the linear temporal logic (LTL) [12]
and the computation tree logic (CTL) [13]. They operate
with the simplest, logical model of time: it is measured as
the number of executed state transitions, or discrete steps.
The problem of model checking is, given a discrete finite-
state model and a temporal requirement, to determine whether
this requirement is satisfied for this model, and, if it is not,
optionally provide a counterexample trace.
In CTL, constraints over the system’s formal model are
expressed with Boolean connectives and temporal operators.
For example, operators AG, AF and AX express that their
argument is satisfied always, eventually or on the next step
of the behavior respectively for all future behaviors of the
model. Corresponding operators EG, EF and EX formulate
the same requirements for at least one future behavior.
D. Model checking of automation systems
Model checking of automation systems can be performed in
either open loop or closed loop [3]–[6]. The work [14] refer-
ences several concrete open-loop and closed-loop approaches.
While the closed-loop approach explicitly considers the model
of the plant, in open-loop model checking, a more traditional
and simple approach, the plant model is reduced to plant
sensor measurements which are assumed to have arbitrary
values and are independent from each other. This can result in
counterexample behaviors that demonstrate scenarios that are
not possible in the real world. Such scenarios can, for example,
involve measurements radically changing their values in an
instant, which is impossible for physically slow processes.
Ruling out such counterexamples manually costs effort.
On the other hand, nuclear automation systems are designed
to be fault tolerant, and an analyst should not automatically
disregard a counterexample that shows “impossible” plant
response since it may be relevant due to possible failures of
plant sensors. Thus, from the safety point of view, closed-loop
modeling represents a challenge. By closing the loop, the state
space of the model is usually reduced [3], and it is possible
that relevant behaviors (that would reveal a design issue) are
accidentally filtered out [15].
A comparison of open-loop and closed-loop model checking
is provided in [16]. According to this work, these approaches
are complementary to each other. Then, in closed-loop model
checking it is possible to check temporal properties which
involve plant variables unobservable by the controller. Model
checking results of other properties may be different in the
open-loop and closed-loop cases.
E. Model checking tools
Two model checking tools are involved in the present study.
The first tool is the symbolic model checker NuSMV [17]. It
accepts the model and the specification to be checked in the
form of a text file. The model has a number of variables with
values from finite ranges. The initial state of the model and
allowed state changes are expressed with constraints which
form two formulas, INIT and TRANS. While INIT simply
defines which value combinations of state variables form valid
initial states, TRANS is formulated over two variable set:
the set of current variables, denoted by variables names, and
the set of next-step variables, whose names are additionally
marked by the keyword next.
By means of such constraints, expressing finite-state ma-
chines becomes straightforward in NuSMV. The second in-
volved tool, called MODCHK, is the enhancement of the
toolset presented in [18] and can be viewed as a user-friendly
interface to NuSMV which allows to specify and verify
automation system as a number of function block networks.
MODCHK is also partially integrated with Apros.
F. Related work
In [7], simplified simulation plant models are synthesized
based on source code of PLC programs. Formal modeling
is not considered in [7], and the construction method works
only for manufacturing systems. In [19], formal discrete-state
models of the entire closed-loop system are constructed as
nondeterministic finite-state event generators using the data
obtained from a running real-world controlled plant. This
approach, however, is not suitable for mission-critical systems
such as NPPs, which must be verified prior to operation. The
technique [20] constructs automation system models to detect
anomalies, but not for formal verification. In [5] and [21],
plant models are built based on 3D CAD drawings, but the
construction process is not fully automated. Another field of
research is construction of software models [22].
Finally, the work [6] deals with automatic formal plant
model construction from behavior examples and LTL spec-
ification of the plant. Using such a plant model, it is po-
tentially possible to verify multiple controllers prior to their
deployment. However, the method proposed in [6] has limited
scalability and cannot construct plant models with hundreds or
thousands of states given hundreds or thousands of behavior
examples. The present paper develops the work [6], mitigating
the scalability issue by focusing on a more specific problem
where only behavior examples, or traces, are available.
III. PLANT MODEL CONSTRUCTION
Following some preliminary definitions, two plant model
construction methods are proposed in this section. Both
approaches are currently implemented to produce NuSMV
models, but can be modified to support other formats. Their
implementation is available online as a part of the extended
finite-state machine construction toolset.2
A. Definitions
The source of data for automatic plant model construction
is a set of traces, or input-output behavior examples of the
plant. Since the plant model is the part to be constructed
automatically, traces will be viewed in terms of its interface.
First, the plant model has a set of inputs I = {i1, ..., ik}, each
of which can be either Boolean or real-valued (continuous).
Inputs describe the state of plant actuators, which receive
information from the controller. Second, the plant model has
a set of Boolean or real-valued outputs O = {o1, ..., om}.
Together, plant model inputs and outputs will be referred to as
plant model parameters. Plant and controller model interaction
is cycle-based: on each cycle the controller model first reads
plant model outputs and then produces inputs to the plant
model. The duration of each cycle is fixed.
A trace element is a pair (O, I), where O is a list of m
outputs and I is a list of k inputs. A raw trace of length `
is a finite sequence of trace elements ((O1, I1), ..., (O`, I`)).
Since model checking usually operates with discrete values,
continuous parameters must be discretized. This is done by
distributing the values of each continuous parameter into
a finite number of intervals, the indices of which will be







`)) obtained from the raw trace by
replacing each real value with the corresponding discrete level.
Boolean values remain unchanged (i.e. they have two discrete
levels). Fig. 1 shows an example of a trace and illustrates the
process of trace discretization.
Assuming that traces are available and discretized according
to the selected thresholds, the problem of plant model con-
struction can be defined. Let v(I) and v(O) be the sets of all
discrete level combinations of plant model inputs and outputs
respectively. A plant model is a tuple (S, S0, v(I), v(O), T, λ),
where S is the finite set of states, S0 ⊂ S is the non-empty set
of initial states, v(I) and v(O) are the input and output sets,
T ⊂ S×v(I)×S is the transition relation, and λ : S → v(O)
is the output function. This definition is a variant of the
definition of a nondeterministic Moore machine [8], which
has been partially adopted from [6]. Assuming that the plant
model interacts with the controller model in the cycle-based
way, the following requirements must be satisfied:
1) the plant model must have the given discretized traces
among its valid finite input-output behaviors (i.e the ones
which start in S0 and proceed according to T );
2) in each state, the behavior of the plant model must
be defined for each possible input combination (states
2https://github.com/ulyantsev/EFSM-tools/
violating this condition, or deadlocks, are undesired in
model checking);
3) some input-output behaviors must be impossible for the
plant model (this requirement is not formalized, but the
choice of these behaviors must depend on traces).
B. Explicit-state method
In the explicit-state method, the formal plant model is
sought according to its definition, as a nondeterministic Moore
machine, where each state corresponds to certain discrete
levels of plant model outputs. To construct the state machine,
the following procedure, partially adopted from [6], is applied.
For each element of v(O) found in discretized traces, a state
is created. This state is included into S0 if and only if it
corresponds to the beginning of some trace. For each pair












To prevent deadlocks, if some transitions are missing after
the described procedure is applied, they must be added. Dif-
ferently from [6], the unknown input combination is directed
to the same states as the closest (averaged over all inputs)
combination for which a transition sourcing in the considered
state exists. Depending on whether a transition has been
added based on this completion procedure or traces, it will be
called either an unsupported or a supported one, respectively.
Transitions triggered by input combinations absent in traces
(unknown input combinations) are added in a different way: if
ordinary transitions are present from O′i to O
′
j1
, ..., O′jn , then a
transition group is added for each unknown input combination
to each of O′j1 , ..., O
′
jn
. Fig. 2 shows an example of a state
machine constructed using the discretized trace from Fig. 1.
Finally, the finite-state machine is explicitly encoded in
NuSMV, which is a straightforward process. Discrete levels of
real-valued parameters are mapped to corresponding numeric
intervals (only integer values are allowed in NuSMV). During
the encoding, additional fairness constraints are added to pre-
vent self-loops from being executed eternally. Self-loops are
ubiquitous in plant models due to the common situation when
none of the plant model outputs change their discrete levels
between consequent trace elements. Paths eternally taking
these loops often prevent target plant states from being reached
(since the state of the plant remains unchanged forever), which
causes violations of liveness requirements. Fairness constraints
remove such behaviors from consideration. In NuSMV, these
constraints are introduced by defining a variable indicating that
the state of the plant has changed during the last step, and
adding a FAIRNESS declaration for this variable, obliging it
to be true infinitely often.
C. Constraint-based method
The rationale behind the constraint-based, or the sym-
bolic method, was to produce condensed models with shorter
NuSMV representations which are easier for NuSMV to pro-
cess. Instead of explicitly defining states and transitions, this
method constrains plant model parameters and their changes




























Fig. 1. Trace discretization. Real-valued input in1 is discretized into intervals [0.0, 25.0), [25.0, 50.0), [50.0, 75.0), [75.0, 100.0) indexed from 1 to 4.
Real-valued output out1 is discretized into intervals [0.0, 0.75), [0.75, 1.5) indexed from 1 to 2.
in1’ = 3














Fig. 2. Example of a plant model constructed by the explicit-state method
given the trace from Fig. 1. Unsupported transitions are shown in broken lines.
The initial state is indicated by the arrow without a source state. Transitions
for unknown input combinations are not shown and are assumed to lead to
both states from the left state and only to the right state from the right state.
state variable is declared for each of m plant model outputs.
The values of these variables encode discrete levels of the
outputs. Then, using the data from the traces, the following
constraints are added to the model:
1) each output may only have values found in the traces;
2) for each pair of outputs, only value pairs found in some
trace element are possible;
3) for each output, only its value transitions found in some
pair of contiguous trace elements are possible;
4) for each pair of an input and an output, only output
values are possible which occur after the given input
value in some pair of contiguous trace elements.
The transition relation of the model permits all possible tran-
sitions satisfying these constraints. Similarly to the explicit-
state method, fairness constraints preventing eternal self-loop
executions are added (a self-loop is assumed to be executed
when none of discrete levels of plant model outputs change).
Nontrivial constraints generated from the discretized trace
in Fig. 1 are expressed in NuSMV in Table I. Constraints
of types 1–2 are expressed twice: for the initial states (with
the INIT keyword) and for each consecutive state (with the
TRANS and next keywords). Note that primes are not allowed
in NuSMV, but they are shown in the table for convenience.
The same plant model is also illustrated in Fig. 3. Note the
difference between this model and the one from Fig. 2.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, the proposed plant model generation methods
are evaluated on a case study. All experiments were performed
on the Intel Core i7-4510U CPU with the clock rate of 2 GHz.
TABLE I
NUSMV EXAMPLE OF A CONSTRAINT-BASED PLANT MODEL
Type Constraints
1 INIT out1’ in {1, 2}
TRANS next(out1’) in {1, 2}
2 INIT out1’ = 1 & out2’ | out1’ = 2 & !out2’
TRANS next(out1’) = 1 & next(out2’) | next(out1’)
= 2 & !next(out2’)
3 TRANS (out1’ = 1 & next(out1’) in {1, 2} | out1’
= 2 & next(out1’) = 2) & (!out2’ & !next(out2’) |
out2’)
4 TRANS (in1’ = 4 -> next(out1’) = 1 & next(out2’))
& (in1’ = 3 -> next(out1’) = 2 & !next(out2’))
& (in1’ = 2 -> next(out1’) = 2 & !next(out2’)) &
(!in2’ -> next(out1’) = 1 & next(out2’)) & (in2’
-> next(out1’) = 2 & !next(out2’))
in1’ ∈ {2, 3}
in2’ = truein1’ = 4
in2’ = false








Fig. 3. Plant model constructed by the constraint-based method given the
trace from Fig. 1 and represented as a state machine. The figure corresponds
to the constraints from Table I. Transitions for unknown input combinations
are not shown and are assumed to lead to both states.
A. Case study
For the case study, a generic simulation model of an NPP
with a pressurized water reactor (PWR), hereafter referred
to as the generic PWR model, was used. This Apros model
was provided by Fortum Power and Heat Oy,3 a power utility
with NPP operation license in Finland, and includes the most
important process, mechatronic and control components of an
NPP, and corresponding automation logic. Due to its large
size, the case study considered only eight automation block
networks out of 44 networks modeled in Apros. The names of
these eight subsystems were masked and are indicated as S1,
..., S8. Subsystems S1, ..., S5 are responsible for activating
protection functions, and the rest control pressures and liquid
levels in tanks. Controller NuSMV models for the selected
subsystems were constructed using MODCHK.
Functional CTL requirements were prepared for each sub-
3http://www.fortum.com/
system using the documentation of the generic PWR model,
its actual implementation and our own understanding of the
model. Controller-only requirements are the ones which are
sensible to be verified without a plant model (they do not
depend on feedback between the plant and the controller).
The most common examples of such requirements are of the
request-response type: they require some controller outputs
(e.g. an activation of a protection function) given some con-
ditions over inputs. In contrast, plant-and-controller require-
ments are not intended for open-loop verification as they re-
strict plant model outputs which are assumed to be unrestricted
in open-loop verification. For example, the following plant-
and-controller requirements were formulated for S7:
1) AG(p < p1 → AF p > p1): “always, if pressure p goes
below p1, eventually it will be above p1” for several low
pressures p1;
2) AG(p > p2 → AF p < p2): “always, if pressure p goes
above p2, eventually it will be below p2” for several high
pressures p2.
Simulating the generic PWR model, we collected 3000
traces, each with 240 elements corresponding to a four minute
long simulation with the sampling time of one second.
B. Plant model construction
Maximum construction times of explicit-state and
constraint-based plant models were 4.7 and 3.1 minutes
respectively. The numbers of states in the explicit-state model
and constraints in the constraint-based model are shown in
Table II. The diversity of these numbers indicates that models
of various complexities are included in the case study. A
more interesting property of plant models is the percentage of
supported transitions (also shown in Table II), which are more
reliable than unsupported ones. This metrics characterizes
the sufficiency of traces and the adequacy of plant parameter
discretization given the traces. From the data we can see
that the case study may be further improved, but, on the
other hand, we are able to investigate plant models with
the majority of transitions created according to our heuristic
completion procedure.
C. Closed-loop model checking
Table II shows the results of closed-loop verification with
generated plant models: the numbers of satisfied requirements
(out of the maximum possible numbers) are presented together
with model checking time. Each model checking run was
limited to 48 hours. As visible from the table, verification
times are smaller for constraint-based models. Still, there are
subsystems for which verification even with constraint-based
models is infeasible in realistic time. The supposed reason for
this is the complexity of controller models.
There are cases of requirement violations. On one hand,
violations (which are limited to the case of plant-and-controller
requirements) may be explained by the wrong understanding
of the generic PWR model by the authors. On the other hand,
a smaller, simpler case study may be beneficial to analyze the
relation of such violations with plant model reliability.
D. Example
Below, we focus on S7, a rather simple subsystem compared
to others. Responsible for pressurizer pressure control, S7
controls spray valves and the pressurizer heater (9 real-valued
plant model inputs) given the pressure p and the liquid level l
in the pressurizer (2 real-valued plant model outputs). When
p is too high, closing signals for pressurizer spray valves are
generated. Then, the pressurizer heater power depends on l,
and the pressurizer heater is turned off if l is too low.
All controller-only requirements, which related controller’s
inputs and outputs, were satisfied in verification with both
plant models. However, such a result is not surprising since
they were also satisfied in open-loop model checking. A more
interesting situation was observed for plant-and-controller re-
quirements given in Section IV-A. Despite S7 being responsi-
ble for pressurizer pressure control, none of the requirements
were satisfied for the constraint-based model and only require-
ments of the second type were satisfied for the explicit-state
model. By examining the traces, we were able to see that such
requirements were already violated in them, i.e. the generic
PWR model may show behaviors violating the requirements,
and the constructed constraint-based model is able to point
this. Then, the examination of the explicit-state model revealed
that some of the requirements were satisfied due to the inability
of the model to leave some of its states given the existing
controller – paths leading to such states were excluded from
consideration due to fairness constraints.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented two methods of plant model synthesis
(the explicit-state and the constraint-based ones) for closed-
loop model checking and evaluated them on a case study
involving an NPP simulation model. Both methods generalize
simulation runs of the closed-loop system: while the explicit-
state method treats occurrences of all plant model param-
eters as separate states, the constraint-based method infers
dependencies between limited subsets of these parameters.
According to Table II, the constraint-based method is superior
over the explicit-state one in terms of time required for model
checking. On the other hand, tight integration of MODCHK
with NuSMV prevented us from exploring the case of explicit-
state model checking (e.g. using the verifier SPIN) – it may
potentially speed up verification of explicit-state models due
to the small number of states in them.
Compared to the previous method of the authors [6], the
proposed methods are to a large extent more scalable. While
the method [6] generated models with up to 80 states from
traces with up to 1000 elements in total, the proposed explicit-
state method was able to handle 720000 trace elements and
construct plant models with up to 4906 states. Supporting
the same input data complexity, the constraint-based method
constructs more concise models with more states. On the other
hand, the proposed methods do not support LTL properties
for the plant model as input data, but such properties may
be difficult to obtain in practical cases, while the demand to
construct larger models from larger trace sets does exist.
TABLE II
PROPERTIES OF GENERATED MODELS AND RESULTS OF CLOSED-LOOP MODEL CHECKING. TIME LIMIT IS INDICATED AS “TL”
Subsystem S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
Explicit-state method
Number of states 14 1355 1206 192 4906 1904 20 100
Fraction of supported transitions 0.754 0.062 0.025 0.411 0.360 0.303 0.598 0.714
Model checking time (min) 387.2 TL 278.6 TL 687.1 TL 2.1 1.0
Requirements satisfied 5 / 9 – / 30 38 / 38 – / 17 16 / 16 – / 30 18 / 21 8 / 20
Constraint-based method
Number of constraints 36 576 1275 144 357 234 26 20
Model checking time (min) 0.3 TL 278.6 616.3 0.1 TL 0.1 0.1
Requirements satisfied 5 / 9 – / 30 38 / 38 13 / 17 16 / 16 – / 30 11 / 21 8 / 20
Our approach has a number of limitations. First, correctness
of the simulation model, which is usually constructed manually
and hence is also influenced by the human factor, is not ad-
dressed. Then, generated models do not exhaustively represent
possible plant behaviors since the input set of simulation traces
is incomplete. On the other hand, no model can guarantee
exhaustive analysis, and finding the trade-off between the
richness of the model and the feasibility of verification is
inevitable.
Considering the mentioned limitations, the issue of reli-
ability of generated models is still important – otherwise,
the methods will not be adopted in industrial practice. In
Section IV-D, we have found that fairness constraints may
cause some requirements to be satisfied while they must be
violated. The issue of model reliability is also connected with
the preparation of data for the methods. To address it, future
work may involve adjustment of fairness constraints, new
case studies, evaluation of the sufficiency of available traces,
means to record them in order to maximize their utility in
terms of model quality, explorations of strategies of parameter
discretization, and selection of proper cycle duration.
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